In this paper we analyze microdata to explore differences in the rates at which American and German workers leave their salaried jobs to become self-employed. We document that the rate of self-employment is lower in Germany than in the United States, and the rate of transition from wage-earning to self-employment is lower as well. Our results suggest that German workers face liquidity constraints that are more severe than those of their American counterparts and an environment that discourages transitions to self-employment. The difference in transition rates cannot be attributed to observable differences between German and American workers.
Introduction
Self-employment is receiving substantial attention in both the United States and Europe. The notion that self-employment is a good thing for the individual and for society has a long history in the United States; witness Horatio Alger's stories and their echoes in today's culture. In contrast, as Sullivan and Smeeding [1997, p. 2] note, Europeans have traditionally viewed small businesses not as a source of economic dynamism but rather "as a throwback to an earlier (and gentler) era when small farms and family stores dominated rural and small-town economic life." However, European attitudes are changing. As a recent newspaper article indicated, In a historic switch that has both amazed and alarmed financial analysts, investors from Frankfurt to Brussels to Amsterdam have fallen in love with entrepreneurs… Compared with the attraction in the U.S.…the infatuation here is in its early stages. But compared with Europe's past, it is a revolution. (Andrews [1998, p. D1] .) Indeed, according to some accounts, Germany, "the land of social market consensus, is giving way to a brasher place where young entrepreneurs are lionized as modernizing heroes" (Cohen [2000, p. A3] ). Loutfi [1991, p. 1] suggests two reasons for this change of heart. First, with the faltering of the welfare states in Europe, many believe that "some responsibility should be shifted on to entrepreneurs from a state unable to ensure adequate levels of output and productive employment." Second, a positive attitude toward selfemployment may be associated with "disillusionment with central planning and a policy shift towards deregulation." In any case, many Europeans now fear that, unless entrepreneurship increases, "the continent will remain short of jobs and jobcreating technology." (Carr [1996] .)
There is now an extensive econometric literature on self-employment. Much of the focus has been on two related questions: at a given point in time, what variables determine who is self-employed and who is a wage-earner; and during a given period of time, who makes a transition from wage-earning to self-employment. Examinations of one or both of these questions using United States data include Evans and Jovanovic [1989] , Fairlie and Meyer [1996] , Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen [1994] , Bruce [1999] , and Holtz-Eakin and Dunn [2000] . Studies on European countries include Cowling and Mitchell [1997] , Robson [1997] and Taylor [1996] on the United Kingdom; Carrasci [1997] on Spain; Johansson [1998] on Finland; Blanchflower [2000] on the OECD as a whole; and Harhoff, Stahl, and Waywood [1996] , Pfeiffer and Pohlmeier [1992] , and Georgellis and Wall [1999] on Germany.
1 A key issue in many of these studies is whether lack of access to capital inhibits the transition to self-employment. This line of research mirrors the concern of many Europeans that their financial institutions are not conducive to the formation of small businesses. "Europe has not had stock markets geared to listing small, risky start-ups" (Carr [1996] ).
Indeed, Black and Gilson [1999] document critical differences in the sources of start up financing between the United States and Germany. For example, in the United States, venture capitalists receive 38 percent of their funds from pension funds; in Germany the figure is only 9 percent. On the other hand, in the United States, banks and insurance companies provide only 18 percent of the funds, as compared to 65 percent in Germany. A natural question is whether the primacy of bank financing in Germany is inimical to entrepreneurship. In particular, do banks exercise monopoly power over the firms to which they lend? Gorton and Schmid [forthcoming] investigate this question, and find no strong evidence that such monopoly power is present, although they stress that the relationship between banks and firms in Germany appears to be changing over time. Do these differences in financial structure, and/or differences in the cultural and demographic environment make it harder, in fact, to become an entrepreneur in Europe than in the United States? Making international comparisons on the basis of results from a group of individual country studies is difficult given that each study focuses on somewhat different issues and analyzes different variables. There have, however, been a number of papers explicitly devoted to analyzing data from several countries at a time, with an eye toward explaining, or at least documenting, differences in their self-employment rates. Examples include Aaronson [1991] , Loutfi [1991] , and Sullivan and Smeeding [1997] , who analyze aggregate selfemployment rates in various developed economies and how they have evolved over time. An important finding in such work is that "there has not been any obvious worldwide trend in … the extent of self-employment relative to wage employment" (Sullivan and Smeeding [1997, p. 1] ). However, as Aaronson notes, the interpretation of aggregate self-employment trends is difficult-without microdata on individuals' decisions, it is hard to know what to make of changes in rates over time.
There have, in fact, been a few studies that employ microdata in cross national comparisons of self-employment. Schutze [1998] looks at self-employment rates in the U.S. and Canada, taking advantage of the U.S. Current Population Survey and the Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances. Blanchflower and Meyer [1994] compare transition rates to self-employment among the young in the United States and Australia, using the U.S. Survey of Income and Program Participation and the Australian Longitudinal Survey. In both papers, a limitation is that the survey questions in the two countries being studied are not necessarily comparable-the surveys were developed by different organizations for different purposes.
In this study, we take advantage of microdata sets for the U.S. and Germany that are from about the same period of time and are based upon very similar survey instruments. The U.S. part of the analysis is based on the familiar Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), while the German part is based on the German SocioEconomic Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP was modeled after the PSID, and has an almost equivalent design. While there is no "typical" European nation, Germany is an interesting country in this context because it seems particularly concerned with the possible consequences of not having enough entrepreneurs. (An article in the Economist called entrepreneurship Germany's "scarcest resource," and noted former Chancellor Helmut Kohl's enthusiasm for new high-tech enterprises (Carr [1996] ).) A further advantage of the two data sets is that they are longitudinal, allowing us to analyze individuals' transitions into self-employment. That is, we can look at an individual's decision to move into self-employment as a function of his or her characteristics prior to the transition. As Blanchflower and Meyer [1994, p. 2] note, "Longitudinal analyses…have the advantage of using past values of individuals' characteristics to explain transitions. We can be more confident that past values are a cause rather than a consequence of being self-employed."
By its very nature, our focus on self-employment concentrates on small-scale entrepreneurship. An alternative strategy would be to restrict attention to the selfemployed who own business assets, who have employed workers, or who have reached a certain scale of production. The importance of liquidity constraints and capital structure for such firms has been studied extensively; see, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen [1988] or Rajan and Zingales [1994] . We focus on micro-enterprises because they have received considerable attention in public discussions on both sides of the Atlantic, and have not been the subject of comparable academic research.
In Section 2 we provide statistical summaries of self-employment in the U.S. and Germany. We compare overall rates in the two countries and how they have changed over time. We also examine how the economic and demographic characteristics of the self-employed and wage-earners differ in the two countries. Section 3 focuses on multivariate analysis of transitions to self-employment. Several major conclusions emerge. First, liquidity constraints are an impediment to becoming self-employed in both countries, but more so in Germany than in the United States. This is consistent with the popular view that European entrepreneurship is hindered by the lack of institutions for allocating funds to small businesses. Second, differences in the rate of transition into self-employment do not stem from observable differences in the characteristics of the two populations. Rather, the cultural and regulatory climates seemingly differ in ways that make Germans less likely to pursue self-employment than their American counterparts with similar observable attributes. We conclude with a summary and suggestions for future research.
2.
Self-Employment in Germany and the United States
As noted above, our comparison of German and United States selfemployment is based upon two data sets, the PSID and the GSOEP.
2 Since 1968, the PSID has interviewed annually a representative sample of some 5,000 families. (For a more complete discussion of these data, see Hill [1992] .) The GSOEP panel was started in the spring 1984. It comprises about 6,000 families that are representative of the German population and include an oversample of "guest workers." (For a more complete discussion of the public use version of these data, see Wagner, Burkhauser, and Behringer [1993] .)
In this section, we use these data to paint a statistical portrait of selfemployment in the two countries.
3 Our analyses are based upon individuals who are aged 18 to 60. Because of our focus on year-to-year transitions from wage-earning to self-employment, we keep only those observations on individuals who work at least two consecutive years. For the GSOEP we have data from 1988 to 1995, and for the PSID from 1984 to 1991. 4 To begin, in Figure 1 we graph self-employment rates by country and gender. We base our computations on the self-reported employment status of the individuals in each survey. Specifically, in the PSID, individuals were asked "On your main job, are you self-employed, are you employed by someone else, or what?" Those who responded "self-employed only" or "both someone else and self" are classified as self-employed. 5 In the GSOEP, the key 2 Specifically, we use the Syracuse University English Language Public Use File. The GSOEP is a more recent longitudinal data set than the PSID. It was developed at the Universities of Frankfurt and Mannheim in cooperation with the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin (DIW), and initially financed by the German National Science Foundation. 3 The summary statistics in this section are generated using the survey sample weights so as to be representative of the populations. 4 From 1990 forward our data include observations from the former East Germany. We tested whether this changed the self-employment process. Using a likelihood ratio test, we could not reject the hypothesis that the coefficients presented below were the same before and after reunification. 5 An alternative approach would be to restrict the focus to the group that answers "self-employed only." This would have the effect, however, of missing those individuals making an initial transition into self-employment (but not yet having left their wage-salary job). As a practical matter, the decision is of little consequence and does not affect our substantive results. Some individuals change self-employment from year-to-year. In Figure 1 , as well as subsequent tables, individuals are classified according to their status as of a particular year. For some individuals, change in selfemployment status might be due more to changes in the organizational form of an enterprise rather than real behavior. We doubt this is a matter of any importance, in part because the United States results in Table 4 (which do not include observations before and after the Tax Reform Act of 1986),
Figure 1
Self-Employment Rates Several observations are clear from the figure: 1) Self-employment rates are higher in the United States than in Germany.
7 2) In both countries, self-employment rates are higher among men than women. 3) While there is some tendency for selfemployment rates to increase over time, the trends are neither dramatic nor monotonic. There is not too much to be said about comparative trends, because the data sets overlap only for four years, 1988 through 1991, inclusive. are very similar to those in Table 3 (which do). 6 A possible problem is that "self-employment" may really be disguised unemployment. To investigate this issue, we computed the percentage of wage-earners and self-employed individuals who worked less than 200 hours per year. In the German data, for most years the proportion of selfemployed who worked less than 200 hours per year was actually less than that for wage earners. In the United States data, the proportions were generally higher for the self-employed, but not by much (almost always less than a percentage point). In short, we see no evidence that individuals who are making transitions to self-employment are really becoming unemployed. 7 The PSID self-employment rates are very similar to those calculated from the Survey of Income and Program Participation over the same period. They are somewhat higher than those in the Current Population Survey (CPS). We suspect that the difference between the PSID and CPS may lie in how the question is asked. As noted above, in the PSID, individuals are asked, "who do you work for" while the CPS figure is based on the response to a "class of worker" question after editing and recoding.
Our main focus in this paper is on entry into self-employment; this is, of course, closely related to the overall level. Specifically, in the long-run, the level of self-employment is the entry rate divided by the sum of the entry and exit rates. In the PSID, the average entry rate is 3.15 percent and the exit rate is 18.24 percent. The corresponding figures in the GSOEP are 1.09 percent and 10.36 percent, respectively.
8 These figures imply a long-run self-employment rate of 14.7 percent in the United States and 9.5 percent in Germany, not too different from the magnitudes in Figure 1 . Thus, while the United States has higher rates of both entry and exit, the former outweighs the latter.
Previous research has suggested that various demographic and economic variables are correlated with the probability that an individual is self-employed in a given year (see, e.g., Fairlie and Meyer [1996] ). Are these correlations the same in the United States and Germany? That is, do the self-employment rates differ because individuals in the two countries have different characteristics? In Table 1 , the first column shows the mean values and standard deviations of various personal attributes for wage-earners in the German sample; the second column shows comparable statistics for the self-employed; and the third and fourth columns have the same information for the United States.
The figures in the table suggest that, on average, self-employed individuals are older than wage-earners in both countries. In both countries, the self-employed are less likely to be "minorities." We put this term in quotations to stress that it refers to quite different population groups in the two countries. In the U.S. it refers to non-whites, and in Germany, it refers to "guest-workers." (There is no ethnicity variable in the GSOEP.) Perhaps a sensible way to interpret this finding is that the self-employed in both countries are less likely to be "outsiders." In both countries, the self-employed are less likely to be female, 9 and relative to wage-earners, the selfemployed are more likely to have had some education beyond college. 10 In both countries, the self-employed are more likely to be married, more likely to own their 8 Our econometric analysis focuses on entry to self-employment. Exits are also of considerable interest, but sample sizes are insufficiently large to allow serious econometric analysis. 9 For detailed analysis of gender differences in self-employment in Germany, see Georgellis and Wall [1999] . 10 The United States and German educational systems are, of course, quite different. In the PSID, the education categories are based on the number of years of education. In the GSOEP, individuals with a standard school leaving degree are assigned a minimum of between 9 and 12 years of education. In addition to these years, individuals with a vocational degree are assigned 2 to 3.5 years more of education. Individuals who attended a technical college are assigned an additional four years of education. If an individual received a vocational college degree or attended a university outside of Germany, then the individual is assigned a total of 18 or 19 years of education. The "less than high school" category includes intermediate secondary school (Realschule) and lower secondary school (Hauptschule). For further details, see Couch [1994] . For our purposes, individuals who have more than 16 years of schooling are assigned to the "post-college" category. 
(=1 if DM 400,000 < wealth < DM 800,000)
(=1 if DM800,000 < wealth < DM 1,500,000) Wage-Earners (3)
1,392,000 (3,449,000) 1,342,000 (3,385,000) The PSID and the GSOEP both provide some data on wealth. The PSID asked the amount of wealth in 1984 and 1989, and reports the dollar value. In the GSOEP, the wealth question was asked in 1988, but all that is reported is the bracket within which the value falls.
12 Still, Table 1 makes clear that the underlying tendency in both data sets is the same-on average the self-employed have higher 11 In the PSID, labor earnings include wages and salary from all employment, self-employment, bonuses, overtime, and commissions. In the GSOEP, labor earnings include wages and salary from all employment including self-employment, training, primary and secondary jobs, and income from bonuses, overtime, profit-sharing, and various kinds of holiday pay. 12 In the PSID, wealth is generated as the sum of the net values of financial assets, owner-occupied housing, real estate, vehicles, and businesses, less mortgages and other debts. In the GSOEP, wealth is defined as net worth (money and property but not household goods and car). Neither dataset provides sufficient detail on business financial structure to examine how the impact of capital market constraints differs by the scale of the enterprise. wealth than wage-earners. 13 In short, the economic and demographic characteristics of the self-employed relative to wage-earners are strikingly similar in the United States and Germany.
So far we have discussed the characteristics of the self-employed in both countries; the next question is what they do. Table 2 shows the occupational and industrial composition of the self-employed and wage-earners in the two countries. The industrial distribution of the self-employed is remarkably similar. The major difference is the higher concentration of the self-employed in manufacturing in Germany, at the expense of fewer in the construction and finance-related sectors. One finds greater differences in occupations. The self-employed in Germany are more likely to be professional, craft-related, and farmers than their U.S. counterparts, while the United States has greater proportions in managerial, sales, and clerical occupations.
Transitions to Self-Employment
We now turn from the issue of who is self-employed to the distinct but related question of who becomes self-employed. In the U.S. data, 3.01 percent (standard error = 0.124 percent) of wage earners made a transition to self-employment from any given year to the next (see Figure 2) . In Germany, the comparable figure is smaller by almost a third, 1.09 percent (standard error = 0.090 percent). One of the main questions we seek to address is why the transition rates differ so much.
14 As noted earlier, both popular accounts and the academic literature focus on differences in lack of access to capital. Evans and Jovanovic [1989] provide a fully articulated theoretical model of entry into entrepreneurship in the presence of liquidity constraints. They show that, to the extent that capital constraints are present, individuals cannot borrow to finance their entrepreneurial ventures, and must rely upon their own resources. (This is analogous to the role of cash flow in the literature on liquidity constraints and corporate investment; see Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen [1988] .) Hence, the magnitude of an individual's own wealth has an impact on the likelihood that he or she becomes self-employed. 15 This notion is nicely captured by an anecdote reported by Jon Winokur in his book, The Rich Are Different: "The eccentric newspaper tycoon James Gordon Bennett once gave a $14,000 tip to a porter on a French train. The man immediately quit his job and opened a restaurant" (p. 55).
In this context, one must note that the figures in Table 1 on the wealth positions of the self-employed versus wage earners tell us little about causation. Individuals may be wealthy because they are self-employed, not self-employed because they are wealthy. That is why we will focus on transitions to selfemployment, looking at whether the probability that a wage-earner becomes selfemployed increases with the level of his or her wealth prior to the transition. 16 14 A t-test easily rejects the hypothesis that the transition rates are equal. 15 An alternative link between wealth and entry into self-employment is that increased wealth might lower risk aversion. Newman [1985] argues that risk-based explanations of entrepreneurship are inadequate. Another possible link is that wealth may allow individuals to exercise their preferences for autonomy on the job. However, we know of no empirical evidence with respect to the impact of wealth on the choice of job characteristics. 16 Even here, of course, problems may arise if individuals accumulate wealth in anticipation of becoming self-employed. In that case, our estimates of the impact of wealth on transitions to selfemployment will be biased upward. As noted below, the PSID data contain some information on 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 PSID Men PSID Women GSOEP Men GSOEP Women
We posit that the probability that an individual transits from wage-earning to self-employment between year t and year t+1 depends on variables dated t. Following the practice in the literature, the variables included are a quadratic in age, "minority" status, gender, earnings, education, marital status, number of children aged 18 and under in the household, home ownership, a quadratic in wealth, and time effects.
17
In principle, it would be desirable to estimate identical models for Germany and the United States. In practice, however, our empirical models differ because the years for which all of the variables of interest are available do not coincide in the two data sets and because the wealth data differ. With respect to the latter, the U.S.
inheritances received by individuals. To the extent that the amounts of such inheritances are unanticipated, they are not subject to this critique. See Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen [1994] . In any case, it is important to note that only past values of wealth are used to explain transitions to selfemployment. 17 Recall that in the PSID, wealth is reported only in 1984 and 1989. The 1984 value is used in all years until 1989, at which point the 1989 value is used. Clearly, it would have been more desirable to have a distinct wealth variable for each year. However, when we interacted the wealth variable with the number of years since 1984, the interaction term was statistically insignificant, suggesting that the inability to "update" wealth was not a serious problem. Similar considerations apply to the GSOEP data. In any case, it is important to note that only past values of wealth are used to explain transitions to self-employment. variable is continuous, while the GSOEP contains a set of dichotomous variables. Further, the PSID contains some interesting data on inheritances that the GSOEP does not. These variables might be useful in investigating whether liquidity constraints are present. Specifically, in 1989 the PSID asked whether the individual had ever received an inheritance, and if so when. (A similar question is asked in the GSOEP, but there were not enough positive responses to allow meaningful analysis.) Our U.S. model includes the amount of any inheritance received at the beginning of the transition period, i.e., year t.
18 Several investigators have argued that inheritance is particularly useful in this context because it is less likely to be endogenous than is the individual's accumulated wealth. (See Blanchflower and Oswald [1998] , HoltzEakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen [1994] , and Taylor [1998] .)
In 1984 the PSID also asked if the individual was expecting any inheritances, and if so, in what amount. We include both an indicator variable for whether an inheritance is expected, and a continuous variable with the amount. The presence of both the actual and the expected inheritance provides an additional way to gauge the importance of liquidity constraints. To see why, note that in the presence of liquidity constraints, the timing of increments to wealth matters because individuals cannot borrow against future receipts. Thus, expected inheritances have no impact on entry decisions. However, in the absence of borrowing limitations, the expectation of an inheritance provides resources to finance a transition. 19 Thus, if borrowing constraints are present, an actual inheritance should increase the probability of becoming self-employed, while an anticipated inheritance should not. The means and standard deviations of the inheritance and expected inheritance variables appear toward the bottom of Table 1 .
It makes sense to estimate the best model we can for each country, given the variables available in the respective data sets. This comes at the cost of making it harder to compare the results. Later in this section we also estimate models with identical specifications and time periods in order to enhance comparability. 18 Individuals were allowed to provide a specific dollar amount for the inheritance or to indicate into which of a series of brackets the amount fell. Since most of the responses were brackets, we enter inheritance as a series of dichotomous variables. Presumably, the responses to the question are based on the nominal value of the inheritance in the year it was received. Given the information in the survey, it is not possible to construct brackets on the basis of real amounts received. To reduce the likelihood of misclassification, we combined several of the brackets together so that the brackets would be larger. To the extent that some misclassifications remain, the measurement error will have the effect of biasing toward zero the effect of inheritance. 19 Even in the absence of borrowing constraints, we do not expect actual and anticipated inheritances to have identical impacts-the latter are discounted because they come in the future and are uncertain.
Best Specification for Each Country
Under the assumption that the error term in the transition process is normally distributed, we can use the conventional probit statistical model. 20 The results are reported in Table 3 . The table suggests both striking similarities and interesting contrasts in the German and U.S. transition processes. In particular:
(a) In the United States, the probability of making a transition from wageearning to self-employment first falls with age and then increases after age 50. In Germany, the probability declines throughout the entire age range (the turning point of the estimated quadratic is age 2). (b) "Minorities" are less likely to become self-employed in the United States.
There is no statistically significant difference for guest workers in Germany. (c) Women are less likely to become self-employed in both countries. (d) Individuals with a higher opportunity cost (measured by earnings) of becoming self-employed are less likely to make a transition, although this coefficient is imprecisely estimated in both equations. (e) Having education past college increases the likelihood of becoming selfemployed in both countries. (f) The point estimate for the effect of children is insignificant in both countries.
We turn now to our main object of concern, the impact of initial wealth on the probability of becoming self-employed. First consider the German results. The point estimates on the wealth categories are strictly increasing, suggesting that, as wealth increases, so does the probability of becoming self-employed. Taken as a group, these dichotomous variables are statistically significant-a chi-square test of whether the four coefficients are jointly different from zero produces a statistic of 28.5, which rejects the null hypothesis at conventional significance levels. Hence, the data are consistent with the notion that Germans who seek to become selfemployed face liquidity constraints.
Turning to the U.S. results, the coefficients on a number of variables are relevant to the issue of liquidity constraints. First, the linear term in wealth has a positive coefficient and the quadratic term is negative. Both coefficients are statistically significant, but the quadratic term does not dominate until the level of wealth exceeds $3.32 million. Only a small fraction of the sample falls within this range (about 240 individuals in 1984). Hence, for all intents and purposes we can say 20 We correct standard errors for heteroscedasticity and multiple observations for certain individuals using the Huber-White method. that just as in the German data, the probability of becoming self-employed increases with wealth. This finding is reinforced by the coefficients on the three inheritance variables-the larger the size of an inheritance received by an individual, the greater the probability that he or she becomes self-employed. (The chi-square test with three degrees of freedom on these variables is 8.69, which is significant at the 0.034 level.) Finally, the notion that liquidity issues are at play is buttressed by the fact that the expected inheritance variables are statistically insignificant. The expectation of receiving an inheritance has no impact at all. Rather, the individual requires wealth (or inheritance) in hand.
The results in Table 3 suggest, then, that both German and U.S. workers who seek to become self-employed face liquidity constraints. Are the constraints more severe in one country or the other; that is, is the importance of having personal wealth to replace market finance greater in Germany or the United States? Making quantitative comparisons on the basis of the results in Table 3 is difficult because the time periods used to estimate the German and U.S. models are not exactly the same. Even given the inclusion of time effects, this may render comparisons problematic. Further, the wealth variables in the two specifications are quite different. In the United States model, wealth is measured continuously and there is information on inheritances. The German wealth variable is categorical and there are no inheritance data. Hence, in the next section we estimate a set of models that are designed explicitly to facilitate comparisons of liquidity constraints across countries.
Uniform Specification
As just suggested, we can achieve better comparability by using only the years in which the samples overlap. In addition, we convert the U.S. wealth variable into a set of categorical variables (measured in Deutschmarks), and delete the U.S. inheritance information. 21, 22 In short, we can obtain more directly comparable results at the cost of reducing the number of observations and decreasing the quality of the U.S. wealth data. Incurring this cost allows us to make meaningful comparisons of how wealth affects transitions to self-employment in the United States and Germany. Further, it allows us to decompose differences between the U.S. and German transition probabilities.
The results are reported in Table 4 . The first thing to note is that for both the German and U.S. equations, the statistically significant coefficients are all of the same sign and generally at least roughly of the same magnitude as their counterparts in Table 3 . In particular, the GSOEP coefficients on the wealth categories exhibit the same patterns in both tables. Hence, the results with respect to wealth are not sensitive to the time period used in the estimation. Turning now to the U.S. column in Table 4 , the coefficient on WEALTH1 is negative, small in absolute value, and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Transition probabilities for this group are basically the same as those in the lowest (omitted) group. But in the WEALTH2 21 The estimates presented in Table 3 do not use the 1990 and 1991 waves of the PSID because they did not have inheritance data. Given that in this exercise the inheritance data are not brought into play, we can use the 1990 and 1991 waves. 22 To transform the U.S. wealth variable so that it conforms to the German data, we use the 1984 exchange rate to convert the dollar figure into Deutschmarks, and then group the data into the same brackets as in the GSOEP (see Table 1 ). In the PSID, 57.1 percent of the observations are in the WEALTH1 category, 7.1 percent in WEALTH2, 2.3 percent in WEALTH3, 1.1 percent in WEALTH4, and the remainder in the omitted category. group, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant, and the coefficient thereafter increases with wealth. This is no great surprise, given the fact that when wealth was entered as a continuous variable in Table 3 it had a positive impact throughout essentially the entire range. Still, it is comforting to see that the effect is still present in the smaller sample, and does not depend on the presence of the inheritance variables.
With the results in Table 4 , we can make direct comparisons of the impact of wealth on the probability of becoming self-employed. To begin, we compute a "baseline" probability for Germany by setting all the wealth variables equal to zero and the other variables equal to their actual values, multiplying by the corresponding coefficients in the first column, and using the probit transformation. The same procedure employing U.S. data and the coefficients in the second column generates the U.S. baseline. Next, we repeat the exercise for each country, this time setting WEALTH1 equal to 1 and recording the induced change in the probability. Then we set WEALTH1 back to zero and set WEALTH2 equal to 1, allowing us to see how moving from the first to the second wealth category changes the probability, and so on.
The computations, which are reported in Table 5 , are quite striking. In Germany, a move from the lowest wealth class to the WEALTH3 class has the cumulative effect of increasing the probability of a transition by more than a factor of 9, from 0.00966 to 0.0869. The comparable calculation for the U.S. takes the probability from 0.0301 to 0.0557, an increase of less than a factor of two. And moving into the highest wealth bracket in Germany generates even more dramatic results, increasing the probability by 0.125, as opposed to the U.S. figure of 0.0599. In short, transition rates to self-employment increase with wealth in both Germany and the United States, but the sensitivity is much higher in Germany, suggesting that liquidity constraints are more of an issue there. 0.1252 0.05992 a The baseline probabilities of a transition in the first row are found by computing the expected probabilities using the probit coefficients in Table 4 and substituting the actual values of the right hand side variables, except assuming the WEALTH dichotomous variables are all zero. The second row shows how the respective probabilities change by a move into wealth group 1, the third row by a change from group 1 to 2, and so on.
Sources of Differences in the Transition Rates
Thus far, we have focused on the effect of wealth upon transition probabilities. However, a glance at either Table 3 or Table 4 suggests that other factors are also at work. This raises the question of whether one can "explain" the large difference between the average probabilities of a German worker and a U.S. worker making a transition to self-employment (0.0109 and 0.0315, respectively). There are two possible sources for the difference. First, Germans may have fewer of the attributes that are characteristic of individuals who make transitions to selfemployment in the United States. Alternatively, it may be that, given the cultural and economic environment in Germany, even if Germans had exactly the same (observable) characteristics as Americans, their transition rate to self-employment would be lower.
The parameter estimates in Table 4 allow us to address this issue. Specifically, we take the U.S. coefficients from the second column and use them to find the transition probability for an individual who has the mean value of each characteristic in the U.S. sample, which turns out to be 0.0256. Next, we use the same set of coefficients to find the transition probability of an individual who has the mean value of each characteristic in the German sample. That is, we compute the transition rate as if the "average German" were acting according to the American model. This probability is 0.0221, which is not very different from the figure using American means. Thus, differences in German and U.S. transition rates are not due to differences in the characteristics of the workers, but to differences in the underlying transition processes as reflected in our parameter estimates. Of course, we could just as well substitute average American characteristics into the German model (i.e., use the coefficients from the first column of Table 4 ). The equation based on GSOEP data predicts a transition rate of 0.00398 for a person with the average German characteristics and 0.00593 for a person with the average American characteristics. Thus, regardless of which country we use as a baseline, the story is the same.
We have shown that the differences in transition rates are due to differences in the coefficients governing the transition processes, rather than the characteristics of the two populations. What aspects of the economic or cultural environment might account for the dissimilarities? Several possibilities have been suggested: (a) There is insufficient financing from venture capitalists for firms in their early stages. For example, according to Black and Gilson [1999, p. 38] , in the United States, 19 percent of venture capital funds go to firms in the seed or startup phase; the corresponding figure for Germany is only 10 percent. (b) Banks play a relatively large role in financing young firms in Germany;
to the extent that monopoly banking characterizes these relationships, the returns to entrepreneurship are reduced (See Gorton and Schmid [forthcoming] .) (c) Germany lacks a " 'food chain' for entrepreneurs. In America, venture capital comes with advice about managing a fast-growing company.
There are lawyers and consultants who specialize in the field." But a typical German entrepreneur has "to learn everything himself." (Carr [1996] .) (d) "Regulation is time-consuming and expensive" relative to the U.S. (Carr [1996] .) (e) The structure of taxes and social programs may lead to low selfemployment rates. (f) The European culture discourages risk-taking. Bankruptcy is regarded as a disgrace. "This is compounded by the European urge to preserve existing structures." (Carr [1996] .) However, Black and Gilson [1999] have suggested that cultural attitudes and financial institutions are mutually determined.
It is, in general, not clear how to translate these anecdotal explanations into differences in regression coefficients. 23 However, in the next section we do some rough calculations relating to the role of the regulatory environment.
Occupation and Regulation
There are natural reasons for the ease of entry into self-employment to differ across industries and occupations. In Germany, however, there are also potentially important regulatory constraints on entry. For instance, the Crafts Regulation Act specifies that in 120-odd crafts a person can become self-employed only if he or she has certification as a "meister" or employs someone with such certification. To take another example, a "Notar" (a kind of lawyer who handles legal documents but does not appear in court) must obtain additional certification to be self-employed. Or, consider physicians. A substantial proportion of health care in Germany is financed publicly, but self-employed doctors cannot receive payments under government programs unless they have more certification than their counterparts who work in hospitals. Of course, many countries, including the United States set licensing standards for a variety of professions. A paralegal in the United States, for example, must wait for a lawyer and cannot set up shop on his or her own. But most observers believe that "in Germany the entrance barriers are higher, the rules more complex and the punishments harsher." (Andrews [1999] .) In 1998, a woman who had worked illegally as a roofer for three years was fined 80,000 marks, or about $47,000.
In the models presented in Tables 3 and 4 , we excluded occupational and industry variables because of concerns that they might be endogenous. However, including these variables might shed light on the potential importance of educational and licensing barriers to self-employment. Further, they could help to control for differences across industries in start-up capital requirements. Therefore, we reestimated the transition equations including dichotomous variables for occupation and industry. Table 6 shows partial results when the specifications from Table 4 are augmented with such variables. For purposes of comparison with Table 4 , we report not only the coefficients on the occupation and industry variables, but also those on the wealth variables as well. (Sales is the omitted occupation and services is the omitted industry.) Drawing inferences from the coefficients about the role of regulations is not straightforward. To see why, consider the figures for Germany. Among the occupations, the most negative coefficient is for the professions. This might be due to the regulations discussed above. However, it might also be that These are the results when the probit models in Table 4 are augmented with dichotomous variables for occupation and industry. We report only the coefficients on those variables and the wealth variables. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Sales is the omitted occupation and services is the omitted industry.
b Industry or occupation variables were dropped from the equation when they predicted an outcome perfectly.
German professionals simply prefer to work for others for any number of reasons. In the same way, while the coefficient on crafts puts it in about the middle of the occupations, it might be that in the absence of the Crafts Regulation Act, the coefficient would be much less negative.
In a rough attempt to calibrate the magnitudes of the German coefficients, we follow a two-step procedure. First, we compute the percentage change in the transition rate implied by the coefficient for each occupation. Next, we bring the U.S. results into play by subtracting the percentage change in each occupation for the United States from the percentage change for that occupation in Germany. This is essentially a "differences-in-differences" calculation that shows the relative impact that engaging in a given occupation has on the probability of being self-employed in Germany. We find that professions and crafts end up in two of the top three places in terms of percentage reduction relative to the United States. 24 One must, of course, be very cautious in interpreting this finding-the implicit assumption is, after all, that in the absence of the regulations the patterns in the United States and Germany would be the same. Further, for the comparison to be exact it must be the case that in both countries regulation has the same impact on entry into the base category, sales and services. Still, these results are consistent with the notion that the German regulatory regime discourages transitions to self-employment.
Conclusions
Entrepreneurship has been called Europe's scarcest resource, and among Europeans there is widespread concern that lack of self-employment has deleterious effects on their economies. In this paper we have taken advantage of microdata that allow us to explore differences in the rates at which American and German workers leave their salaried jobs to become self-employed. We document that the rate of selfemployment is lower in Germany than in the United States, and the rate of transition from wage-earning to self-employment is lower as well. We find evidence that German workers face liquidity constraints that are more severe than those of their American counterparts. Further, the difference in the transition rates cannot be attributed to observable differences between German and American workers. Both of these results are consistent with anecdotes about Europeans who leave home to become successful entrepreneurs in the United States:
"Open up the pages of any [European] business magazine and you will read features about Frenchmen and Germans who made it big in Silicon Valley. Upon arrival, they worked feverishly to hook up with a venture capitalist and, in the wide-open U.S. market place, soon achieved success of a type impossible in the Old World." (Richter and Bachman [1999] .)
The fact that observable differences in the populations do not seem to be driving the results leads to the question of what legal or cultural factors might be at play. The answer is not clear. To be sure, there are numerous regulations facing anyone who starts a business in Germany. A German who wants to start a hotel, for example, needs to file a certificate certifying his health status, and in agriculture one's buildings need to satisfy a variety of ecologically-motivated specifications.
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But the owners of small businesses in America also complain about the regulatory costs imposed by agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency. While we find some evidence that the regulatory environment in Germany discourages self-employment in certain occupations, a useful topic for future research would be systematic comparison of the regulatory burdens in the two countries.
Another important part of the economic environment is government support for small business. In both countries, policy makers have set up numerous programs to aid small businesses. Interestingly, the result is a hodgepodge in both countries. Between the federal and regional governments in Germany, there are more than 400 programs; in the United States the situation is similar. An additional useful research topic would be to assess the impacts of such programs in both countries.
Appendix A
In the text we showed that if one substitutes the mean values of all the Germans' variables into a transition equation estimated using U.S. data, one obtains a predicted probability that does not differ very much from the U.S. probability. The purpose of this appendix is to report the results when we do a similar analysis on a variable by variable basis. As in the text, we begin by substituting the mean values of the American characteristics into the equation based on U.S. data (second column of Table 4 ), and compute the implied probability of making a transition. Then, we take the i th characteristic, replace its value with the German mean, and recompute the probability. (In cases where several variables represent one characteristic, e.g., education, we change the means of the variables simultaneously) The difference between these two probabilities tells us the change in the American transition rate induced by changing characteristic i to its German value. In effect, then, the calculation shows the impact of U.S.-German differences in variable i upon the transition rate. The figures are reported in Appendix In each case, the effects of changing the mean of a U.S. variable to its mean in Germany has only a small impact on the baseline probability, which is 0.0256. To put this finding in context, recall that when we substituted all the German means into the probit equation estimated using U.S. data, the expected probability was not very different from the probability generated using U.S. means. The results in Appendix Table A-1 tell us that this finding is not the consequence of some large positive and negative effects offsetting each other. Rather, on a characteristic by characteristic basis, the differences in the U.S. and German means are not big enough to generate substantial differences in the probabilities of making a transition to self-employment.
